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RIGHT TO COUNSEL
People v. Joseph 122
(decided December 22, 1994)
The defendant claimed that his right to counsel under both the
State123 and Federal124 Constitutions was violated when he was
forbidden to discuss his testimony with counsel over a weekend
recess. 12 5 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the conviction
and ordered a new trial12 6 because the length of prohibition
prevented the defendant from discussing trial events which
covered the "heart of his defense." 12 7
Defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree because
during an altercation with his former spouse, he burned her with
acid. 128 The defendant testified about the incident at trial because
he also sustained burns and there was an issue as to whether he
was the initial aggressor. 129 The trial testimony started on a
Friday afternoon and when the court adjourned for the weekend,
the defendant was directed not to speak with his counsel about his
testimony. 130 However, the court did permit him to speak with
counsel about all trial matters other than his testimony. 13 1
Subsequent to the conviction, the appellate division held the trial
court's prohibition of attorney-client communications about the
ongoing testimony during the weekend recess violative of the
122. 84 N.Y.2d 995, 646 N.E.2d 807, 622 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1994).
123. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with ounsel... ." Id.
124. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV. The Sixth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial ... and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." Id. The Sixth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
125. Joseph, 84 N.Y.2d at 996, 646 N.E.2d. at 807, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
126. Id. at 996, 646 N.E.2d at 808, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
127. Id. at 998, 646 N.E.2d at 809, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
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constitutional right to counsel and reversed the conviction,
ordering a new trial. 132
Despite the fact that the court of appeals did not cite to the
seminal case of Strickland v. Washington,133 it nevertheless set
out sufficient United States Supreme Court precedent to support
its decision to affirm the appellate division.
The first Supreme Court case cited by the Joseph court was
Powell v. Alabama.134 In Powell, the defendants were each
accused of rape and each received the death penalty after a one
day trial. 135 The defendants were not afforded counsel at their
arraignments and their appointed counsel was not ready for trial
or even familiar with Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. 136
The Powell court held that the failure of the state to give the
defendants reasonable time and opportunity to obtain counsel was
a denial of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 137 In light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court
stated that for the right to counsel to be meaningful it "requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings." 13 8
In addition, in Geders v. United States, 139 the Court held that a
seventeen hour prohibition of attorney-client contact during an
overnight recess was violative of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 140 The Court viewed the length of time involved as far
too long to ban all communications between attorney and
client.141 It was also stated that there are other options a trial
132. People v. Joseph, 198 A.D.2d 437, 438, 605 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (2d
Dep't 1993) (stating that unlike a brief recess, it cannot be presumed that a
defendant would spend an entire weekend discussing ongoing testimony with
her attorney, although some discussion is likely).
133. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
134. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
135. Id. at 55.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 71.
138. Id. at 69.
139. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
140. Id. at 88.
141. Id. The court stated that "[i]t is the common practice during such
recesses for an accused and counsel to discuss the events of the day's trial.
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL
judge could use to prevent the improper "coaching" of witnesses
short of a ban on all communication. 142 For example, the trial
judge has the discretion to change the order of witnesses and can
postpone the lunch hour or evening recess should either be
necessary to preserve the "integrity of the trial." 143 Furthermore,
in Brooks v. Tennessee,144 the Court held that should a conflict
arise between the defendant's right to counsel and the
prosecution's wish to cross-examine the defendant without
testimonial influence of other witnesses, such conflict must be
resolved in favor of the right of counsel. 145
Moreover, in Gideon v. Wainwright,146 the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in felony cases was held applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 147 In Gideon, the state of
Florida refused to supply counsel for an indigent's defense of a
felony charge. 148 As a result, the defendant represented himself
pro se was convicted, and received a five year prison
sentence. 149 In addition, the Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin,150
held that the rule espoused Gideon applies to defendants in any
trial where imprisonment may be imposed. 151
However, the right to counsel is not without limitations. In
Perry v. Leeke, 152 the Supreme Court held that an order
prohibiting the defendant from spealdng with anyone, including
his attorney, immediately at the end of defendant's testimony or
during a fifteen minute recess did not violate the Sixth
Such recesses are often times of intensive work .. .. The lawyer may need to
obtain information made relevant by the day's testimony ... "Id.
142. Id. at 89.
143. Id. at 91.
144. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
145. Id. at 611.
146. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
147. Id. at 343.
148. Id. at 337.
149. Id.
150. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
151. Id. at 40. The Court rejected Florida's rule which only supplied
counsel to indigents if the potential imprisonment exceeded six months. Id.
152. 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
19961 1063
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Amendment right to counsel. 153 The Court's concern was not
primarily that the attorney would violate ethics regulations and
"coach" the testimony, but rather that there was the danger that
even if the attorney ethically assisted a defendant during the
break period, it would impair the discovery of the truth by
helping the defendant regain his "poise and sense of strategy." 154
The Court reasoned that even with the assumption that there was
no deceit on the part of the witness, it would interfere with
effective cross-examination, which is designed to "punch holes in
a witness's testimony at just the right time, in just the right
way." 155 Thus, in the federal system, there is a continuum which
holds that absolute speaking bans, for long periods of time are
unconstitutional but bans, for shorter periods (i.e., for recesses
such as lunch), are acceptable.
In People v. Blount,156 the Appellate Division, Second
Department, indicated that it would follow the federal rule
regarding attorney-client communications during recesses. The
court in Blount held that the trial court violated the defendant's
right to assistance of counsel when it prohibited the defendant
from discussing testimony with his attorney during an overnight
recess during cross examination. 157 Similarly, in People v.
Hagen,158 the court held that the trial court's instruction to the
defendant not to discuss "her testimony in any manner, shape, or
form" 159 during an overnight recess violated the defendant's
right to counsel. 160 Both of the above mentioned cases rely on
the Supreme Court decisions in Perry, and Geders as a guide in
153. Id. at 280.
154. Id. at 282.
155. Id. The court stated that it was appropriately within the trial judge's
discretion to determine whether cross-examination would be more truthful by
prohibiting discussion between the witness and third parties during a brief
recess, even if the witness was the defendant. Id. at 282-84.
156. 159 A.D.2d 579, 552 N.Y.S.2d 441 (2d Dep't 1990).
157. Id. at 579-80, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 441-42.
158. 86 A.D.2d 617, 446 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2d Dep't 1990).
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determining the constitutionality of a prohibition of
communication between attorney and client.
Conversely, in People v. Enrique,16 1 the defendant was denied
all access to counsel during a two hour recess for lunch, taken
before his testimony was completed. 162 The two hour prohibition
was upheld as being constitutional by the court of appeals, which
found that the decision whether to allow a defendant access to
counsel, during such a limited time period, was a matter within
the discretion of the trial court. 163 In Enrique, the defendant
argued that New York should adopt a broader standard under
article I, section 6 of the New York State Constitution. 164 than
the federal interpretation based on Geders and Perry.165 It was
urged that counsel should be allowed to communicate with a
client on any subject at any point during a trial, regardless of
whether the defendant is in the midst of testimony. 166 The
Enrique court stated that there was no convincing reason asserted
by the defendant as to why New York should expand its rule
beyond the federal standard. 167 Thus, the broader standard was
rejected, with the court noting that there was never a difference
in interpretation between the state and federal rights in question,
and that all of the New York cases in this area used federal law
in their decision making process and never "even hinted that the
state rule might differ from the federal."168 Therefore, the New
York and federal view in this area are similar in their application.
161. 80 N.Y.2d 869, 600 N.E.2d. 229, 587 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1992).
162. Id. at 870, 600 N.E.2d at 229, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
163. Id. (affirming the order of the appellate division, 165 A.D.2d 13, 22,
566 N.Y.S.2d 201, 207 (lst Dep't 1991)).
164. See supra note 123.
165. 165 A.D.2d at 21, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 206.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. See also People v. Enrique, 80 N.Y.2d 869, 600 N.E.2d 229, 587
N.Y.S.2d 598 (1992). The lone dissenter, Judge Kaye (now Chief Judge)
stated that both federal and state law had been violated in this instance, and
that the right to counsel under New York's Constitution afforded broader
protections than the federal, but she did not offer any caselaw to support these
positions. Id. (Kaye, J., dissenting). In fact, the caselaw in New York
1996] 1065
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